

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 045199

O 311210Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4258

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 2127

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, JO, XF

SUBJECT: SENATOR MCGOVERN'S TALK WITH KING HUSSEIN

1. SUMMARY. THE KING AND SENATOR MCGOVERN DISCUSSED A WIDE RANGE OF MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES. THE KING REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM FROM JORDAN'S PERSPECTIVE. THE KING BLAMED ISRAEL FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS LAST WEEK. SENATOR MCGOVERN AVOIDED ATTRIBUTING BLAME, BUT SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY AND THE CONGRESS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH SOME LIMITATION ON AID TO ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY IF IARAE L DID NOT DEMONSTRATE MORE FLEXIBILITY. THE SENATOR THOUGHT THAT THE BASICS FOR A SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR A RETURN TO THE 1967 BOUNDARIES AND A SOLID PEACE AGREEMENT FOR THE ISRAELIS. HE REPEATED THAT HE THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE SOME ENTITY ESTABLISHED FOR THE PALESTINIANS. KING OUTLINED HIS HOPES THAT THE ISSUE OF THE WEST BANK WOULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER INDEPENDENCE FOR THE WEST BANK OR CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN AS VIABLE OPTIONS. KING REGRETTE D ISRAELI INCAPACITY TO REACH A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN IN 1974 AND FELT THAT PRESENT SITUATION WAS MOST DEPRESSING

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HE HAD YET WITNESSED AND WAS DEEPLY AFRAID THAT THE

AREA IS HEADED TOWARD WAR. END SUMMARY.

2. SENATOR MCGOVERN MET FOR AN HOUR MARCH 30 WITH KING HUSSEIN ACCOMPANIED BY STAFF MEMBER STILLMAN AND BARON AND AMBASSADOR.

3. SENATOR BEGAIN CONVERSATION BY NOTING THAT MANY PEOPLE IN THE AREA AND MOST IN THE U.S. CONSIDERED KING HUSSEIN ALONG WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AS A VOICE OF RATIONALITY AND REASON IN THE AREA. HE ASKED FOR THE KING'S ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND HOW HE LOOKED AT THE FUTURE.

4. KING WELCOMED THE SENATOR AND PROVIDED HIM WITH A VERY LONG DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF JORDAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES. MOST OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY IS FAMILIAR TO THE DEPARTMENT AND I WILL NOT REPEAT HERE IN ANY EXTENSIVE DETAIL THE POINTS WHICH HE MADE. IN SUM, HE COVERED JORDAN'S ATTACHMENT TO THE WEST BANK, HIS OWN PERSONAL AND FAMILY TIES TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA, THE JORDANIAN POSITION ON THE WEST BANK AS IT HAS EVOLVED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, JORDANIAN PROPOSALS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND A PLEBISCITE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SOLVING THE WEST BANK-PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, JORDAN'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS, THE RABAT SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND ITS EFFECTS ON JORDAN IN THE INTER-ARAB, INTERNATIONAL, AND DOMESTIC CONTEXTS, THE SECRETARY'S CURRENT MISSION AND HIS RETURN HOME AND THE KING'S RESULTING VERY SERIOUS PREOCCUPATION WITH THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE CONFLICT. AT ONE POINT THE KING SAID THAT HE FELT THE MOST DEPRESSED THIS WEEK THAT HE HAD FOR YEARS AND THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION RESEMBLED THE LEAD-UP TO THE 1967 WAR.

5. KING THEN TALKED ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE DONE FOR THE FUTURE. HE BROACHED THE IDEA OF A POSSIBLE
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UN SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA. THE SENATOR ENDORSED THE STUDY OF THE IDEA AND ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE IDEA HAD BEEN GIVEN SOME CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON, BUT WE THOUGHT THAT THE ADDITION OF A NUMBER OF PEOPLE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE PROBLEM WOULD THEN TO RESULT IN UNHELPFUL AND PROPAGANDISTIC DEBATE. WE WERE DETERMINED

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4259

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EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

PREMISED ON THE RETURN OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND THE CONCLUSION OF SOLID PEACE AGREEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN ON SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL WHATEVER IT CHOOSES TO DO. KING SAID HE WAS MOST GRATIFIED TO HEAR OF THIS POSITION AND HOPED THAT THE CONGRESS WOULD PURSUE THIS LINE. HE PERSONALLY FELT THE ISRAELIS BORE MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE SECRETARY'S ACTIVITIES AND HE COULD NOT SEE HOW, IF THE U.S. COULD
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NOT GET BACK FIFTY KILOMETERS OF SAND, IT EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE ON THE DIFFICULT ISSUES OF THE GOLAN, WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM. THE KING ALSO EXPLAINED HIS NEED FOR AIR DEFENSE.

7. THE SENATOR AND THE KING DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM. THE KING MADE THE POINT THAT THE PARTS OF IT FORMERLY UNDER ARAB CONTROL WOULD RETURN TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY, BUT THERE WAS NO REASON WHY IT COULD NOT BE AN OPEN CITY AND THE CAPITAL BOTH OF ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN ENTITY.

8. THE KING OUTLINED FOR THE SENATOR IN SOME DETAIL HIS VIEWS ON WHAT MIGHT BE THE MOST PRACTICABLE WAY TO SOLVE THE ISSUES OF THE WEST BANK. THERE SHOULD BE BY ALL MEANS SOME EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER FREE CONDITIONS SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK SHOULD BE ASKED TO DECIDE NOT ONLY WHO THEIR LEADERS WOULD BE, BUT ALSO THEIR FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND FUTURE RELATIONSHIP TO JORDAN OR ANY OTHER STATE IN THE AREA. IF THEY WANTED IT, THIS COULD MEAN FULL INDEPENDENCE.

9. THE KING OUTLINED BRIEFLY FOR THE SENATOR THE SORT OF HELP WHICH HE WAS PROVIDING TO OMAN AND THE OTHER STATES IN THE GULF. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE INTENDED TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA SOON AND WOULD HAVE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH KING KHALID AND PRINCE FAHD. UP UNTIL THEN IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO COMMENT IN ANY INFORMED WAY ON HOW HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA WOULD EVOLVE.
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